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Abstract
It is well known that intrusion detection systems can
make smarter decisions if the context of the traffic being
observed is known. This paper examines whether an
attack detection system, looking at traffic as it arrives at
gateways or firewalls, can make smarter decisions if the
context of attack patterns across a class of IP addresses is
known. A system that detects and forestalls the
continuation of both fast attacks and slow attacks across
several IP addresses is described and the development of
heuristics both to ban activity from hostile IP addresses
and then lift these bans is illustrated. The system not only
facilitates detection of methodical multiple gateway
attacks, but also acts to defeat the attack before
penetration can occur.
Keywords: Intrusion Detection, Firewalls, Prevention,
Analysis.
1 Introduction
During the last decade the numbers of networked
computers globally has increased astronomically due to
the rise of the internet. As a consequence the threat of
attack against computer systems is very real, resulting in
network security becoming one of the most important
priorities not only for system administrators, but for the
average network user.
Just as virtually every email user has received spam and
virus emails, effectively every computer has had its ports
probed, been infected by a virus, or been trivially (or
extensively) attacked by another user. While the internet
does connect us to the “Information Super Highway” it
also allows malicious users to use the same highway t to
attack any other user or server connected to it either,
directly or through shared network access.
It is at this point that network security infrastructure steps
in to provide protection to users from malicious users and
their attacks. There are two main types of protective
infrastructure which is widely deployed on networks
currently: Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems.
Firewalls act as a means of access control, allowing, and
disallowing, access into and out of a given network;
Intrusion Detection Systems are designed to detect any
malicious behaviour which is occurring on the trusted
side of a Firewall. Many networks have grown so large
that they often possess several access points to the
internet (or to other networks), each protected by an
individual firewall or gateway.
This paper will examine a significant shortfall in existing
implementations for one of these vital lines of defence.
This shortfall is the ability of firewalls to detect or
respond to an attack which is being undertaken against
multiple gateways on a single network at one time. The
reason for this shortfall will be examined, and then
methods of responding in an appropriate manner will be
explored.
2 Log Analysis
A fundamental component of any system which monitors
network activity is the Audit log. The audit log records all
of the activities which have happened at a given place
within the network; whether it is a gateway or another
type of network monitoring sensor. It is this audit log
which is examined by Intrusion Detection Systems to
identify malicious activity.
Attacks are generally identified by Intrusion Detection
Systems examining audit logs by one of the following
two methods: Anomaly Detection and Signature
Detection.
The Anomaly detection method requires a profile of each
user or user group to be made to enable the system to
“learn” what comprises normal behaviour (Heberlein et
al. 1990; Holden 2003). The behaviour model is then
compared to user actions upon the system, searching for
behaviour that does not fit the model; this behaviour is
then classed as abnormal behaviour and treated as an
intrusion.
Anomaly detection is broader than just mapping profiles
of human usage. It is also applicable to processes and
network access or usage (Hofmeyr, Forrest & Somayaji
1998). Network traffic analysis can yield profiles of
normal usage that can be used in monitoring network
traffic for anomalies and thus to detect attacks.
The Signature detection method searches audit logs for
known attacks, matching malicious behaviour to pre-
defined signatures. Signature or misuse detection has a
database of attack signatures against which it can
compare network event patterns in order to discover an
attack. This results in signature detection systems being
able to be operational directly after they are installed
without the need for any training of the system (Holden
2003).
Signature based intrusion detection is significantly more
computationally efficient than anomaly based detection
per item of knowledge as it does not need to create
matrices for each system activity (Kumar 1995).
However, Brox (2002) comments that signature detection
has a flaw in that it requires a signature for a given attack
to be able to be detected, and in some instances this is a
case of waiting for an attack to occur, to then be able to
make a signature to protect against it.
3 Detection Context
The context of network traffic as a topic in network
security has grown in importance over the last decade.
Initially the focus was only on Firewalls, which have
progressed from being simple packet filters to more
context aware proxy and dynamic packet filters
(Cheswick, Bellovin & Rubin 2003). Likewise, various
Intrusion Detection Systems have been designed and
modified to also utilize and act upon information based
on the wider context of an environment, or users’
behaviour (Porras & Neumann 1997; Sommer & Paxson
2003; Vigna, Eckmann & Kemmerer 2000).
There are two primary reasons for the increased usage of
contextual information by these two types of network
infrastructure: efficiency and accuracy. The initial usage
of contextual network information was to decrease the
number of packets examined by a firewall; by ignoring
packets in an already authorised session. Conversely,
Intrusion Detection Systems have tended to use
contextual information in conjunction with attack
signatures to more accurately detect an attack.
Current Intrusion Detection systems using signature or
anomaly detection (or a combination of both) are able to
operate effectively on a single gateway or as a network
sensor. They analyse audit logs (network traffic) within
the context of a single gateway; however if a user attacks
multiple gateways upon the same network they are all
treated as a single gateway attack at each gateway,
meanwhile any breech which does occur is effectively a
breech upon them all. An attack which may appear to be
trivial at each gateway is in the context of the entire
network actually a coordinated attack, and of far greater
interest to the network as a whole.
Detection systems attempting to discover attacks which
target more than a single gateway on a network need to
have a complete knowledge of the given network’s
context. This entails the system having access to the audit
log at each gateway upon the network, and not merely a
listing of alerts or threats from detection software which
are examining behaviour in a single gateway context. The
result is a secondary stage of analysis of network events.
This takes place at a central location, examining the logs
to look for multiple gateway attacks.
4 Implementation
The work which will be discussed during this paper has
been undertaken in two phases, each comprising a year of
research as an honour topic. The first phase was aimed at
testing the hypothesis that it was possible to detect attacks
which occur against multiple gateways upon a single
network. The results of this phase will be briefly
discussed in this paper, however they have been outlined
further in Scanlan et al. (2004). The second phase of the
research is currently underway and this paper will discuss
a selection of interesting preliminary results from this
work.
4.1 Phase 1
The initial work carried out was designed to test the
hypothesis that malicious source IP address could be
detected attacking multiple gateways upon the same
network through centralised analysis. The system which
was implemented analysed actual audit data from a
gateway range that consisted of multiple remote gateways
along with the central server (ns1). Ns1 is bound to the IP
addresses of almost a complete C-class running from 0 to
252 in the last octet. The resulting IP range of ‘virtual’
consecutive gateways, as it appears externally to be 253
separate machines when really each IP address will report
to the same machine in one amalgamated log. The audit
log still reports which IP address within this range was
probed, meaning that it is possible to analyse the data
from this single machine as though it were 253 separate
gateways. The majority of the log data used in this study
is comprised of simple port probes which have been
targeted against IP’s within the range.
As the goal of the system is to know what is happening
across each gateway on the entire network, the retention
of context is vitally important. The context of the
amalgamated log is preserved through the way in which
the log is parsed by the system. The system contains 2
modules: the Analysis module and the Tracking module.
 The Analysis module stores a simple profile of each IP
which probes the network in a database. This profile
consists of such information as IP, target gateway, target
port, date and time, ID number, two Boolean values and a
probe count. The two Boolean values are used to store
whether or not the given user has probed more than one
gateway or more than one port. This Audit table
effectively compresses the amalgamated log down to
being a single entry per malicious IP, indicating how
often they have probed the system and whether or not
their probes have been against multiple ports or gateways.
The Tracking module examines each IP address at a
much greater resolution, in terms of information being
recorded, than the Analysis module. The tracking module
is not used for every IP, but only those which appear to
be of interest to the Analysis module through probing
multiple gateways or ports. For each probe which is sent
by an IP a new entry is added to the tracking table,
recording the IP, target gateway (for each gateway and
not merely the first gateway as in the Analysis module),
target port, date and time. This allows for the activities of
an IP to be closely examined in terms of attempting to
define a pattern of attack and this could well be useful for
linking different attacking IP’s with similar patterns to
being the same user who is changing IP addresses.
The second goal of the system was to examine if a
threshold level could be established and at which point
this should be set.  Then if the number of probes from a
single user exceeded the threshold they could be classed
as a threat to the network as a whole with an acceptable
level of accuracy.
Table 1 Individual Source IP Address
4.1.1 Phase 1 Results
The two main results from the first phase of the research,
applied to our project goals: proving the hypothesis that
attacks across multiple gateways could be detected, and
deciding whether or not an effective threshold level could
be established.
As described in section 4, the Analysis module records a
series of details about each IP address that probes the
network. This includes a count of their actual probes, and
whether or not a source IP has probed more than a single
gateway. Table 1 displays several statics which were
gathered by the Analysis module. The first section of
these was gathered on the Phase 1 log file. This log file
was about 10MB in size and covered the 10 day study
period of the 1st of September 2003 till the 10th of
September. During the Study period 6766 individual
source IP addresses probed the gateways, of which 776
(11.5%) probed multiple IP addresses. This represents a
sizeable risk to networks which had previously gone
unnoticed; however noticing that an attack has indeed
occurred is only the first step; being able to detect it
efficiently is the second half, and the more valued
challenge of phase 1.
The analysis module records a count of the number of
probes which have been sent by each source IP address
against any of the gateways on the network. The second
goal of the system was to see if this count could be
effectively used to gauge whether or not a user is likely to
probe multiple gateways. To investigate the usage of this
simple heuristic several test levels were examined. When
examining the count value it was found that 83% of
source IP addresses sent 3 or less probes against the
network. For this reason 3 was the first value we
examined as a possible threshold value, followed by 6
and 9 as these were also values where a substantial drop
off in probe counts were seen. This heuristic was then
used with the Boolean signifying a multiple gateway
attack in order to try and classify source IP addresses.
The results showed that at a threshold level of 3 only
3.2% of IP’s were classified as potentially performing
scans on multiple gateways. With the optimum of 11.5%
to get all potential malicious probes it is a relatively poor
result. By comparison, when the threshold level was
increased to the levels of 6 and 9, the results returned
were 8.3% and 10% respectively. These results were
much more acceptable, however not quite at the levels
desired. Figure 1 illustrates the result from further testing
of other threshold levels. The optimum level efficiency
was found to be at an 11 probe threshold.
The threshold level signifies the point at which, if a user
exceeds the level at a single gateway, they are highly
unlikely to probe multiple gateways. The result is that it
is possible to track and detect over 90% of users who
attack multiple gateways upon a single network.
4.2 Phase 2
Phase 2, which is described in the remainder of this
paper, builds directly on top of the system implemented
to complete the work in Phase 1.
The first goal in Phase 2 is to verify the work which was
done in Phase 1 by using a larger, and longer (in terms of
time) log file. Phase 1’s log file was not a very large one
and this validation is required to certify that the results
can be duplicated over a longer time period.
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Figure 2. Effectiveness of Detecting IP address probing Multiple Gateways
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Figure 3 Ten days of gateway activity recorded by the Tracker Module
However, once this is accomplished there are several
other more practical goals to examine. One of these is the
creation of an action module to respond to the users who
attack multiple gateways upon the network. This module
needs to protect the gateways on the network which have
not been attacked by the malicious user ahead of their
future attempted attacks.
The concept of adding additional rules to firewalls ahead
of an attack upon the given gateways when a multiple
gateway attack may not result in attacks on each gateway
is bound to have some administrators sceptical of the
system. Concerns about the performance cost of the
number of rules which are on firewalls are of great
concern to system administrators, and have resulted in
rule efficiency applications being produced (Hoffman,
Prabhakar & Strooper 2003). Thus the idea of adding
extra rules to a series of gateways needs to consider the
possible cost in performance on those gateways, as it is
obviously of greater concern than when a single rule is
added to a single gateway. Phase 2 will aim to be able
add and remove the rules it creates in real-time, with the
length of the time which a rule is on a firewall to be
optimised to be as short as possible, while still providing
adequate protection.
For the removal of rules to occur in a timely fashion
while still providing protection to the gateways of the
network it was necessary to examine the results from the
Phase 1 Tracking module to see in what way malicious
users were attacking the network. Figure 3 illustrates the
two main attacks which were occurring during the Phase
1 log: fast scan and slow scan. The fast scans generally
lasted just a few seconds, through to being a few minutes
in total length. Figure 4 shows a classic fast example of a
scan which lasts 1 min and scans all 250 IP’s within the
class C address. The slow scans last a far longer, often
scanning at similar time intervals between probes lasting.
0
50
100
150
200
250
9:06:29 9:06:37 9:06:46 9:06:55 9:07:03 9:07:12 9:07:21 9:07:29 9:07:38
Time
F
in
al
 O
ct
et
 o
f 
T
ar
g
et
 IP
 A
d
d
re
ss
Port Probe
Figure. 4 Scan across multiple gateways from a lone source IP address.
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Figure 5 Reaction Time for blocked users across Multiple and Single gateways.
over several days. A third type of scan is a hybrid of the
first two types, with a user doing a short fast scan,
waiting 24 hours or longer, and then doing a second short
fast scan. As a result of the differing scan types, an
optimum ban time cannot be a static value and still be
effective, it needs to be a dynamic value based on the
activities of the given source IP. A further factor affecting
the length of the optimum ban time is the apparent
difference between malicious users who attack multiple
gateways and those who attack single gateways. Figure 5
illustrates the speed at which users stop their activity once
they have been blocked upon a gateway. The line which
indicates the multiple gateway attackers (the blue, or
higher values on the graph) follow is the same general
pattern of stopping the attack once blocked, but is
substantially faster than that of single gateway attackers.
It takes 11 probes for over 90% of the multiple gateway
attackers to cease their activities, while it takes twice that
at 22 probes for single gateway attackers.
To be able to optimise the ban length without putting the
system at risk from a malicious user the Action module
also maintains a history of malicious IP’s for a short time
after their ban being lifted. This will result in the ability
to reapply a ban to a repeat offender who returns after
their ban has been lifted without them needing to go
through the analysis process again, and risk breaking
through the firewall and causing any damage to the
internal resources of the network.
4.2.1 Phase 2 Results
Phase 2’s results can be split into two main groups: Phase
1 validation and automated attack response.
The validation of the results which were produced by
Phase 1 was the first priority before adding much further
to the system. A few optimisation tests were completed
on the system, the results which are displayed in Table 1
(along side those of Phase 1 for comparison). The Phase 2
log is substantially larger than the Phase 1 log, being 270
MB in size, and covering the time period of July 1st
through July 21st of 2004. The results showed that not
only are multiple gateway attacks also detectable within a
larger more comprehensive log; but were actually more
prevalent than previously discovered in Phase 1. The
Phase 2 log shows that over 20% of probes detected upon
the network were from source IP’s interested in multiple
gateways on the network, a 100% increase on the Phase 1
log. While there is a 10 month difference in time between
the logs, it would seem unlikely that they have grown
more frequent so rapidly. Further examinations of older
log files would be needed to confirm this.
 To fully validate the Phase 1 results, the optimum
threshold level also needs to be calculated on the Phase 2
log. The Phase 2 log, similarly to the Phase 1 log, also
had a large peak at 3 as a possible threshold level. A
threshold level of 3 would result in a detection efficiency
of above 90%; however that would result in ignoring
quite a sizeable number of multiple gateway probing
source IP addresses. Figure 6 (over page) clearly
illustrates the increasing efficiency levels for different
threshold values. The optimum, according to the Phase 2
log results, would indicate that a threshold around 10
would be the most efficient; this validates the threshold of
11 found by the Phase 1 log analysis. Figure 6 also plots
the Phase 1 efficiency line for comparison; it clearly
demonstrates the differences between the log files, but
also their similarity in relation to threshold efficiency.
The remainder of Phase 2 focuses on the way in which
the system responds to a source IP which has been found
to be probing multiple gateways. The initial task in this
was to create an Action module for the system to use to
deal with the discoveries from the analysis module. The
Action module adds and removes the source IP addresses
from the Linux iptable based firewalls running on each of
the network gateways. The module also maintains a
Figure 6 Comparison between Phase 2 and Phase 1 for optimum threshold level.
network state within the database which allows for bans
to be lifted upon their expiry.
 The concerns mentioned in section 4.2 mean that the
length of time which a rule remains in place needs to be
as efficient as possible in order to keep the total number
of rules to a minimum and preserve network
performance. As a result the optimum ban time
calculation will need to be both scalable and dynamic.
The calculation will need to be scalable to enable it to
work efficiently with short term bans in response to fast
scans lasting several seconds; while still returning a larger
ban time to enable the network to be protected from slow
scans lasting several days. It is assumed that the vast
difference between the different types of scans means a
static value will be inefficient as it will result in being one
of two things: far too long for fast scans in an attempt to
provide protection for slow scans, or be too short in an
attempt to be efficient for fast scans.  This would only
result in rules being reapplied multiple times for slow
scans. To verify this conclusion we included a commonly
used static value as a benchmark for the dynamic
calculations.
For the ban length calculation to be well suited to each
source IP address it needs to be individualised to the
given IP. A straightforward way to do this is to record the
mean time difference between each probe from the source
IP addresses. The result is that the number returned for a
scan lasting several days is far larger than the resulting
number from a scan which lasted under 10 seconds. This
mean time interval is the foundation of the ban length
calculations we tested.
Interval Squared: Squaring the interval allows for a ban
length to be calculated based entirely off of the mean
interval while still scaling quite high to provide protection
to the network.
Interval x Interval / 2: Similar to Interval Squared,
however producing a shorter ban length in an effort to
possibly attaining maximum efficiency.
Interval x Threshold: While appearing to be chosen for
convenience, this calculation is actually based off Figure
5 where the approximate optimum point for a interval
multiplier is equal to our already existent threshold of 11.
Static 24 Hour: This value is being used a pseudo
benchmark as it is sometimes used by administrators.
In addition to these calculations, a static value of 100
seconds is added to each result using the mean time
interval in the calculation to allow for the cases where a
source IP address probes extremely fast and the scan is
completed in under a second (as in Figure 4). This results
is a mean time interval of zero seconds when the ban is
initially added, thus resulting in the ban being lifted as
soon as it is applied.
Figure 7 illustrates the results from the different ban
length calculation methods which were trialled. The y-
axis details the number of iptable rules are currently in
place on the network, while the x-axis details the number
of iptable commands which have been sent across the
network to add or remove a rule.
The twin squared ban time calculations have resulted in
being the worst ban length calculations in terms of
efficiency. While they are based most tightly on the time
interval between attacks, resulting in the biggest
difference in ban lengths, they very quickly result in bans
which are in excess of what is required to stop a source
IP’s activities. The ban lengths which are calculated are
too long and are thus efficient in terms of the number of
rules being sent across the network, but the bans remain
in place long after they are no longer needed. The result
can be seen by the two functions lines on the graph going
out of the bounds of the graph after only 5000 iptable
commands have been sent.
Figure 7 Comparison of Ban Length Calculation Methods
The remaining two methods, the static 24 hour ban length
and the attack time interval multiplied by the threshold
level each have their strengths and failings.
The static 24 hour ban produced some surprisingly good
results; while initially as the worse then the optimum it
quickly became the best in terms of the number of rules
upon the network gateways. Now while it is obvious that
the static 24 hour ban length results in having a longer
ban length and longer scans require the rules to be re-
added multiple times, it still performs well. This real
strength of the static 24 hour ban results from it resulting
in this method having something the other method do not
have: a maximum ban length. Where the other methods
often calculate a ban that lasts weeks or months in the
worst case, it still remains at 24 hours in this method. The
result is that if a ban time of a large length is seen to be
needed, but the source IP actually has no interest in a long
term attack and ceases their activities the rule remains on
the gateways for a long time needlessly. While these ban
times result from the logical scaling up of methods which
work in shorter time periods; however at larger time
periods the methodology which drives the dynamic ban
length calculation fails. Despite returning good results in
terms of the numbers of rules present on the gateways, it
adds and removes rules a lot more frequently then the
other methods. The 24 hour ban actually returns 50%
more iptable commands then the optimised threshold
method discussed shortly.
The Interval multiplied by the threshold method starts off
as the best case, but results in creeping above the 24 hour
static ban over the 20 day period. There are two problems
one can notice when examining Figure 7: it sends more
rule requests to the gateways than necessary and it keeps
a lot of rules in the gateways for too long. These two
problems are related in that they are the opposite of each
other, and a function of the threshold method being too
closely constrained by the average case.
The first problem, of sending too many rule requests to
the gateways, results from ban lengths which are too short
being calculated and are then lifted before the user has
stopped attacking. When a ban is lifted and a source IP
attacks again they get re-banned, and then eventually re-
unbanned when the rule expires. The result is that 3
iptable commands are sent across the network when only
one would have been required with a more accurate ban
length calculation.
In an effort to counter this scenario, a version of the
system was made which checked for activity by a source
IP address in the previous two attack interval periods
prior to the expiry time of the ban. If the source IP had
been active, the ban length is increased (half threshold
multiplied by interval time in this test), and no additional
iptable commands are sent. The results which were
produced by this were that over 1200 fewer iptable
commands over the 20 day period (as seen in Figure 7 as
the Optimised line); this was seen to be a significant
improvement.
The larger problem with the Threshold ban length
calculation is the tendency for ban times of several weeks
or months to be calculated. The only method we tested
where this was not an issue was the static 24 hour ban,
which had the obvious maximum ban time. Therefore a
maximum ban length is the obviously solution to be
implemented to combat this issue; this has not been done
for this paper. The maximum ban lengths which are going
to be tested upon the system over the coming weeks will
be 5, 7 and 10 days respectively. When examining the
results from the optimised ban calculation there are 337
banned IP’s out of over 1750 currently in place which
have ban lengths less than 7 days. Utilizing 7 days as the
maximum ban length would cause the vast majority of
currently banned source IP addresses to be examined for
their validity as a current rule upon the gateways of the
network. The result is expected to produce similar
(slightly greater) iptable rule count then the 24 hour
method with still having lower numbers of rules being
sent across the network then the 24 hour method.
In addition to the system storing a state of the network in
terms of current banned source IP’s, the Action module
also keeps a record for a short time of past banned users.
This enables the system to have knowledge of a malicious
IP without needing to have the IP blocked at the gateway.
This longer term retention of contextual information
allows for the analysis module to recognise an IP who has
been banned previously to be re-banned by the action
module without needing to again be analysed as being a
threat. This ‘safety net’ allows for additional protection
against attackers who do not fit the model of behaviour
which suits most source IP addresses.
The Ban History, Banned, and Audit tables in the
database are regularly cleaned of expired and old entries
to keep the database size as small as practicable. This
prevents any performance gain at the firewall due to the
efficiency of the rules from being lost by a overly costly
centralised analysis process.
5 Related Work
There have been continuous developments and
advancements in the examination of electronic audit logs
since the 1980’s. However this has only rarely branched
into the realm of amalgamating logs across gateways to
examine threats at a network wide level. Recent research
in this area has occurred however with the MINDS
project.
5.1 MINDS
The MINDS (2004) (Minnesota Intrusion Detection
System) project has the objective of producing a system
which will allow large scale analysis using data mining
algorithms to detect attacks (MINDS 2004). The MINDS
system uses a combination of signature detection and
anomaly detection to provide protection to the University
of Minnesota network.
The MINDS system uses network traffic flow data
collected from CISCO routers. This audit data is then
filtered to remove extraneous entries before feature
extraction collates the required information for analysis
(source and destination IP’s and ports, protocols,
timestamp, flags). Also catalogued is derived contextual
information such as the amount of traffic to a destination
from a specific source. The extracted, reduced log is then
run through the Attack Detection Module of MINDS
using signature detection to discover any known attacks.
The remaining log is then fed through the Anomaly
Detection Modules that allocates a score to each
connection in relation to normal traffic patterns.
Connections that score highly are then further analysed
by the network administrators to moderate whether or not
the connection was an intrusion or a false positive.
Connections that scored highly by the Anomaly Module,
and are not found to be false positives by the
administrators, are then further analysed to produce new
signatures for emerging attacks. It is in this way the
MINDS system is able to not only protect against the
more common and well known attacks, but is also very
strong on the detection of novel attacks, or attacks which
are not yet supported by many other IDS (Ertoz et al.
2003; Ertoz et al. 2004).
The MINDS project has been developed during the same
period as our own system, and as such, there are some
notable differences between the two implementations.
The MINDS project does not employ threshold level
heuristics in their detection mechanisms, and the system
is not fully intended to be automated process. As it is
does not deal with malicious source IP addresses as an
automated process, it also does not dynamically calculate
how long to ban an IP based on their activity; but requires
an administrator to take the action needed.
6 Further Work
The implementation of our system has progressed well
from being able to initially detect source IP addresses
probing multiple gateways to being able to ban them
efficiently from the network. As a result of being able to
carry out the action needed on the main attack of interest
the continuing work on the system will focus on other
modes and types of attack which can occur across
multiple gateways.
The system currently cleans out the Ban History and
Audit tables as the IP addresses of attackers frequently
change. Further work for the system is to find a way to
use or enlarge the source IP profile information to be able
to link different source IP activity to being a single user,
thus allowing for action to be taken against them faster.
The system currently records whether or not an attack has
been across multiple ports, and then can track the ports
using the Tracking module. Often attacks which occur
across multiple gateways also occur across multiple ports
on those gateways, examining the data relating to this
could increase the rate of detection of threats against the
network.
7 Conclusion
Phase 1 of our system showed that it was possible to
detect malicious source IP addresses which were probing
multiple gateways connected upon the same network.
Previously such trivial attacks have been overlooked by
network security infrastructure, always examining
incoming packets in the context of a single gateway,
exposing networks to a broader more methodical attack.
Phase 2 allows for such attacks to not only be detected
but to also be dealt with through the creation of an Action
module which sends out iptable rules to the relevant
gateways upon the network, with the aim of providing the
needed protection prior to the attacks ‘arrival’ at the
vulnerable gateways.
The Action module not only creates the necessary rules,
but also removes the bans once they have expired
according to the ban time calculation made by the action
module. The result is an efficient attack detection system,
aiming to provide protection to ever growing and
expanding private networks.
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